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Chapter 10 




In the modern economy, there is a growing recognition of the thesis about the im-
portance of institutions for socio-economic development of societies.1 Many em-
pirical studies, both those of a nature of a case study, and cross-sectional analyses 
on large samples of countries, showed that the rules deciding about social life de-
termine the achieved level of prosperity (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Acemoglu, John-
son, & Robinson, 2005; North, 2006). Therefore, in order to program development, 
those in power should devote much attention to the institutions regulating eco-
nomic activity in the country, and the quality of institutions should occupy an im-
portant place in the development strategy.
Under the influence of politicians there are mainly institutions de iure, or for-
mal regulations, laid down in the legislative process. However, in the social reali-
ty there are also informal constraints, of an unofficial nature, with their source in 
the culture and in the history of society. As a result of various interrelationships be-
tween formal and informal regulations, de facto results of the former may be dif-
ferent from those predicted by legislators and, therefore, the whole body of insti-
tutions is important for socio-economic results (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 
2005; Voigt, 2013).
Therefore, one might raise the question of the role played by informal con-
straints in the socio-economic life and the nature of their impact on the effective-
ness of formal institutions. The answer to this question will indicate the appropri-
ate approach to the construction of the development strategy, in particular, whether 
* This paper was originally published in the Jagiellonian Journal of Management in 2016, 2(1).
1 This was proven for instance by a debate which was held in the Journal of Institutional Econom-
ics (December 2011), dedicated to interrelations between institutions and development.
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and how social factors should be taken into account. The aim of the chapter is to 
present the mechanisms of informal institutions from the point of view of socio-
economic development. It presents the hypothesis that informal constraints are the 
basis for daily activities of individuals and as such must be taken into account in 
planning the development of a country. What seems especially important is the in-
formational aspect of all institutions, which means that they allow economic actors 
to build expectations and plan their own activities.
The chapter is a theoretical reflection on issues of programming development 
and institutional change. It presents the views of representatives of contemporary 
institutionalism, and attempts to critically respond to the experiences of the devel-
opment policy.
10.1.  Conceptualization of the notions of development  
and development strategy
Socio-economic development can be treated in two ways – in terms of positive cate-
gories, as a phenomenon occurring objectively, or normatively, as a goal, which so-
cieties should pursue and which in varying degrees can be achieved. When adopt-
ing an objective approach (e.g. Hausner, 2012), to define “development” one can use 
the formulation of Thirlwall (2006, p. 17) who treated it as “the process of economic 
and social transformation of countries.” It is, therefore, a phenomenon occurring all 
the time, consisting in constant changes of living conditions and social provision-
ing. Schumpeter (1960) looked at development in a similar way and emphasized 
the multidimensionality and discontinuity of these changes. Thus, with the devel-
opment strategy in mind, one should remember that it leads not only to the quan-
titative increase of production capacities, but also to the changes of the economic 
and social structure.
The normative aspect of development is equally important. It is a process, as 
a result of which, simply put, people should live better lives. Evaluating the occur-
rence of development, what is observed is not only the material standard of living, 
but also two other dimensions of human existence: the sense of dignity, and free-
dom (Thirlwall, 2006). Improving people’s living standards and higher satisfaction 
of their needs are of course important,2 but preserving the dignity of an individual 
and increasing the range of freedom is a necessary condition for achieving develop-
ment in this sense. Alternatively, referring to Sen (2000, p. 295) development is “(...) 
the expansion of human capability to lead more worthwhile and more free lives.” 
Freedom is not only a goal to which we aspire, but also a means, an instrument of 
development – without which the improvement of economic performance is in the 
2 Particularly in relation to developing countries – economic growth is the best means to eradi-
cate poverty as GDP growth serves poverty eradication (Thirlwall, 2006, pp. 34–35).
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long run impossible. Hausner, among others, writes that the two aspects of devel-
opment – social and economic – mutually condition each other, and increasing ma-
terial prosperity must be accompanied by the dissemination of ethical standards.
Assuming at this stage the above broad understanding of development, one can 
agree with the statement that the socio-economic development is a goal which soci-
ety should pursue. In this way, it becomes the goal for those in power and the basis 
for the legitimacy of their actions. As noted by Kozak (2012), in recent decades in 
business practice, a strategic approach to development has gained significance and 
popularity. Strategy – the concept derived from military terminology, and brought 
to public policies from the business sector (Gorzelak & Kozak, 2012) – means “an 
instrument of conscious and systematic actions aimed at achieving concrete long-
term development goals” (Kozak, 2012, p. 32). The fact that many countries create 
and pursue development strategies is not only a conceptual change, but has a much 
more significant meaning. In the practice of governance of the country, a system-
atic approach, which is characterized by, or at least should be characterized by the 
following features, is gaining popularity (Kozak, 2012):
– long-term planning based on a vision – a desirable state of society in the 
future,
– carrying out an accurate diagnosis of the initial situation, identifying barri-
ers and opportunities for development,
– broad, multi-dimensional approach, taking into account non-economic goals,
– systematic execution and, possible, revision of the planned activities.
In addition to typically practical purposes, the development strategy plays im-
portant informational functions. First of all, one should see in it as an expression 
of the desire to reduce the complexity and uncertainty of the environment. Thanks 
to an accurate diagnosis, the strategy makes it easier to understand the nature of 
 socio-economic processes, points to the barriers and development opportunities, 
and becomes a source of information for economic actors, by setting objectives and 
implementation tools. This way, one can achieve consistency between the actions 
of various actors – both public and private – and mobilize them to take the desired 
action (Kozak, 2012).
Development objectives have to be met in everyday business practice. There-
fore, the primary mechanism of pursuing them will be to influence the decisions of 
economic actors, by increasing their potential, or supporting proper patterns of be-
haviour. Therefore, a special function of development strategy is to create a frame-
work for business activity, that is, institutions. Market activities are always em-
bedded in wider institutional order, which should be the focus of those in power 
(Hodgson, 1998; Polanyi, 1957).
This results in two general requirements for the authors of the development 
strategy. Firstly, it must be effective in improving the material well-being of socie-
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ties, which underlies the positive freedom of individuals. Secondly, it must comply 
with ethical standards, that is, meet the requirement of fairness, in particular ac-
cordingly to the understanding of community, which is to be covered by the strate-
gy. Whether the two presented conditions of a good strategy are complementary to 
each other or may be in conflict will be considered later in the text.
10.2. Informal restrictions
In accordance with the approach of modern institutionalism, the starting point 
for the analyses conducted is to adopt the vision of limited rationality of an indi-
vidual (Chmielowski, 2011). One of its hallmarks are the processes of accultura-
tion, thanks to which people internalize certain common behaviour patterns with-
in the environment (Goldschmidt, 2006) in order to use them later when making 
decisions. Among the internalized elements one can distinguish: customs, norms 
and rules. Although between these three categories there are significant differenc-
es ( Ostrom, 1998), for the purposes of this article they will be understood in a way 
North (2006) understood them, that is, as informal constraints.3 Their common 
distinguishing feature is that they are “produced, communicated and enforced out-
side of the officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 725). On the 
other hand, formal institutions are those that “are produced, communicated and 
enforced through the channels generally accepted as official,” i.e. primarily by state 
authorities (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 725).
What is significant from the point of view of the analysis are the following dis-
tinguishing features of informal constraints (also referred to as restrictions):
– they constitute a restriction for decision-making, as they indicate which 
actions are permitted, advisable or prohibited, and certain choices involve 
sanctions,
– the enforcement mechanism of sanctions can rely on social control or inter-
nal control, based on conscience (Voigt, 2013),
– because they are anchored in the culture and history of societies, they are 
based on ideologies, mental models, and are also very durable and less sus-
ceptible to changes (North, 2006),
– they do not necessarily lead to economically efficient results, because they 
can in fact pursue other social functions: guarantee stability, maintenance of 
power or preservation of tradition,
– they often take the form of tacit knowledge. Because they are treated by in-
dividuals as natural, their exact content may often be difficult to observe and 
communicate (Couyoumdjian, 2012).
3 The chapter interchangeably uses terms “informal limitations,” “informal institutions” and 
“informal regulations.”
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Informal constraints influence the actions of individuals and, more broadly, so-
cial and economic life in different ways. They affect both the preferences of individ-
uals as well as the situation of choice, shaping possible alternatives, the sequence of 
actions or information resources. Firstly, through mechanisms of rewards and pun-
ishments they create incentives to take specific actions. Secondly, the role of restric-
tions is to reduce uncertainty by increasing the mutual predictability of actions. If 
in a given community there are strong rules of action that are effectively enforced, it 
increases confidence regarding the specific behaviour of partners in the interaction. 
This makes it easier to formulate expectations, and build long-term plans. Third-
ly, due to its durability, they help workers and entrepreneurs form specific ways 
of solving economic problems, i.e. routines. Routinization of economic activity in 
turn allows for significant savings of resources and better evolutionary adaptation 
to the environment (Nelson & Sampat, 2001).
Because usually informal rules coexist with formal ones, the analysis focused 
on the nature of the relationship between these two types of restrictions.
When constructing new or trying to change the existing formal institutions, one 
should keep in mind that their impact on individuals does not completely exclude 
the impact of informal limitations. If we accept the model of a socialized individu-
al with limited rationality, there appears uncertainty regarding the results of actions 
of the designed rules. One reason for this uncertainty is acculturation of the norms 
and conventions of conduct (Voigt, 2013). According to Helmke and Levitsky (2004), 
there may be four basic types of interactions between formal and informal restric-
tions: complementarity, substitution, accommodation and competition (Table 10.1).
Table 10.1  Typology of informal rules
Effective formal rules Ineffective formal rules
Compatibility Complementary Substitutional
Incompatibility Accommodative Competitive
Source: Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 728.
The first two types of dependencies occur when formal regulations introduced 
are consistent with existing in the community informal rules. Then the rules of both 
types reinforce each other, which increases the likelihood of achieving the results 
intended by the legislator and is beneficial from the point of view of social stability. 
If formal institutions for various reasons fail, they will be replaced by the activity of 
informal norms and rules (Voigt, 2013).
One can also treat formal institutions as a complement to previous limitations 
of an informal nature. North (2006) draws attention to it indicating that it is a nat-
ural mechanism of institutionalization in conditions of increasing complexity of 
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social reality. Together with the increasing scale of economic relations and escala-
tion of the anonymity of transactions, informal institutions are no longer enough 
and require top-down official reinforcement. Then, the proposed institutions will 
somehow grow out of the existing social conventions. This situation is very advan-
tageous because it can reduce the uncertainty and the development of generalized 
trust in the macro-scale.
What is more complicated is the case of discrepancies between the content of 
formal and informal restrictions. To illustrate this situation, one can use the reason-
ing presented by North (2006, pp. 36–45). Assume that in the conditions of the in-
stitutional balance and the match between institutions a formal institutional change 
was introduced. It will precipitate the whole system out of balance and will create 
tension, because social conventions suited to old institutions de jure will not match 
the new ones. The results de facto observed at the level of society are likely to be for 
some time different from the expectations of those in power, because some people 
will adhere to strongly internalized norms and rules. North (2006) predicts that, 
over time there will occur adaptation of informal restrictions to formal require-
ments of institutional order, but it seems that this scenario is overly optimistic. It 
assumes the effectiveness and efficiency of new institutions and the government in 
enforcing them. What is better suited to reality is the distinction made by Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004) of two scenarios: adaptation and competition. In the first of 
them, with a gradual, non-radical reform, due to the plasticity of culture, it is pos-
sible to adapt informal restrictions to new formal requirements. Such adjustment, 
however, will require the passage of time. From the point of view of authorities, the 
most adverse scenario is clearly a conflict between formal and informal rules. The 
risk of its occurrence increases especially in the case of radical reforms. The society 
may not agree on a new institutional order and continue to act in accordance with 
the informal regulations. This means the failure of reforms and high uncertainty 
about the final social results (Spranz, Lenger, & Goldschmidt, 2012).
The risk associated with the conflictual scenario becomes visible when one pays 
attention to the informational role of institutions. In the case of the two conflict-
ing systems of conduct uncertainty among economic actors increases significant-
ly. There is then no certainty as to how the other party of the transaction or a joint 
action will behave – and whether they will act according to the rule of law or social 
norms. What is more, it decreases the ability to sanction rules, both from the state 
and society, and the resulting institutional dualism is a significant barrier to devel-
opment. Thus, the introduction of the institution, which often aims to reduce com-
plexity and lower transaction costs, may lead to an exactly opposite effect and par-
alyse economic activity (Grzymala-Busse, 2010).
Finally, the dominance of formal rules in the institutional environment may 
have an adverse effect on social capital. The mere fact of external coercion appears 
to negatively influence trust and cooperation. There is a phenomenon of “moral 
hazard”: if public institutions care about reciprocity and trust, then we, as private 
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citizens, no longer have to worry about it. Meanwhile, standards and rules devel-
oped in the activity of the community are its social capital and strengthen confi-
dence and ability to work (Ostrom, 1998).
One should also pay attention to the ethical aspect of institutional change, high-
lighted earlier as a prerequisite of development. It seems that radical reforms that are 
in opposition to informal rules can have, together with the inefficiency described 
above, dubious ethical quality. Of course, there are cases in which informal rules do 
not meet the ethical standards. However, the mere introduction of solutions to con-
flict in relation to the existing social order should each time be subject to scrutiny.
10.3. Critical analysis of development policy
As shown by Easterly (2008), the theory of social sciences has nearly always includ-
ed two opposing approaches regarding the origin of institutions, or more broadly 
– sources of social order. According to the supporters of the “top-down” vision, so-
cial order is imposed from above by the government, and it is based on statutory 
law. In this approach, in its extreme representation, those in power and experts are 
virtually unrestricted in the construction of institutions and may propose solutions 
deemed optimal on the basis of their theory.
Conversely, representatives of the “bottom-up” approach perceive the source 
of rules governing society in everyday interactions at the local level – out of them 
there emerge orders at higher levels. Because they are anchored in local structures 
they cannot be altered in any way, but only carefully and gradually. A similar dis-
tinction is found in the North’s thoughts (2006) – a radical and incremental insti-
tutional change. Description of the properties of these two approaches, in its ideal-
type forms, are shown in Table 10.2.
Many contemporary authors of economic development indicate the dominance 
of the top-down approach in thought and in the economic policy practice of the 
twentieth century, seeing in this fact the source of many failures of the develop-
ment policy (Ostrom, 1998; Rodrik, 2003; Easterly, 2008). In postwar decades, with 
the collapse of colonialism, a fight against poverty and the improvement of the 
economic situation of underdeveloped countries became one of major global chal-
lenges. Through the activities of international organizations and the direct influ-
ence of Western governments, economic policy in many countries in Africa and 
Latin America was conducted according to the standards imposed from the out-
side. Rodrik (2003) describes the attempts to transplant ready-made recipes from 
Europe or the United States – first in the paradigm of development based on im-
port substitution, and since the 80s by the so-called Washington Consensus. Devel-
opment strategies proposed to poor countries were, therefore, first, imposed from 
above, and, second, came from another historical-cultural order. 
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Table 10.2  Two visions of the origin of social order
Top-down Bottom-up
Determination of order Emergence from interactions, 
culture
Statutory law
Government action, possibility 
of institutional change 
Limited, evolutionary Freedom, radicalism
Role of experts, economists Advising incremental changes 
(2nd-best)
Construction of optimal institu-
tions (1st-best)
Basis of search Respect for existing solutions Pure reason
Balance Many One
Source: based on Easterly, 2008.
The vision of the order imposed from above has its roots in the utilitarianism of 
Bentham. Bentham believed that societies are substantially similar to each other in 
terms of needs and, therefore, institutions – the mechanisms of rewards and pun-
ishments – can be fairly easily transplanted between countries. Such “transplants” 
will require some adjustments, but according to Bentham they will not be a prob-
lem for the government, thanks to easy access to the information needed about the 
local community and its preferences (Couyoumdjian, 2012). However, this attitude 
turns out to be too optimistic for several reasons. Excessive universalism of institu-
tional recommendations and top-down nature of the rules lead to conflicts with in-
formal rules, according to the theory presented earlier. North (1994, p. 366) wrote 
that “economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very dif-
ferent performance characteristics than the first economy, because of different in-
formal norms and enforcement.”
Easterly (2008) draws attention to the fact that the formal institutional order 
of rich countries, which enabled them to develop in recent centuries, has its ori-
gins in earlier informal institutions, and is their natural continuation. Easy trans-
fer of ready institutions to poor countries is burdened with a very high risk be-
cause they do not have centuries of evolution of informal rules and norms behind 
them.
It turns out that the Benthman’s approach to the possibility of knowing local 
preferences is unjustified. The tacit nature of knowledge results in the fact that its 
communication, accurate understanding and modifying is very difficult for exter-
nal actors (Couyoumdjian, 2012). If the authors of public policies fail to reach local 
structures of knowledge and information, any attempt to regulate will be burdened 
with the aforementioned risk of increasing complexity. The example of such an 
event could be the transformation of the CIS countries, where the elements of free 
market capitalism were quickly introduced into the post-Soviet socio- economic re-
ality (Chavance, 2008). The weakness of both institutional arrangements, formal 
133Construction of the development strategy versus informal constraints
and informal, as well as the competition between them made it impossible to create 
reliable economic expectations and paralysed economic activity.
Aldashev, Chaara, Platteau, and Wahhaj (2010, p. 29) mention other factors 
that reduce the efficiency of the top-down approach to programming development: 
ignorance of society about the law, the lack of confidence on the part of citizens re-
garding formal rules and state institutions, and the risk of manipulation of the rules 
and regulations by the political elite to seize economic rents. Ostrom (1998), in her 
observations on the development programs carried out by international organi-
zations in developing countries, goes a step further and states that they may even 
be counter-productive, causing perverse effects. The introduction of strong formal 
rules displaces trust between citizens and strikes at the foundations of social cap-
ital. Treating people as passive recipients of policies repeatedly led to negative re-
sults, whereas the public institutions created to strengthen the existing private rules 
led to their disintegration (Ostrom, 1998).
According to some authors, the source of failure lies in the incorrect identifica-
tion of good institutions with the institutions of Western countries, or even more 
narrowly – Anglo-Saxon ones. Relying the development strategy of the country on 
Western institutional patterns, including strong protection of private property and 
increasing the scope of economic freedom, often led to fatal results. Dogmatic free-
market approach disregarded ownership and management rules existing in the re-
cipient societies (Rodrik, 2003; Chang, 2011).
Conclusions
Since the top-down construction of development-oriented institutions is at a high 
risk of failure, then how should authors of public policies proceed with them? 
Rodrik (2003) indicates pragmatism in the first place. The recommendations re-
sulting from the theory of economics, even in its neoclassical edition, are fairly 
general and do not indicate precise institutional forms. The basic requirement for 
starting and maintaining dynamic development is to ensure that economic actors 
ensure the returns of the labour or capital resources involved.4 In order for the eco-
nomic activity to occur, an employee must be sure to receive remuneration for the 
work performed, and the entrepreneur must be able to keep profits from the com-
pany he directs. The ability to create reliable expectations requires clear – formal 
and informal – rules enforced in practice.
Whether this will be done within the framework of private, community or state 
property, and the extent to which the activities will be regulated by the state is a sec-
4 Thirlwall (2006, pp. 74–75) mentions two subsequent, also very general, properties of good 
institutional order – the quality of governance and limitations imposed on politicians.
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ondary issue. Observing the institutional order of the richest countries in the world 
today, one can see a high diversity of institutions, which reflects cultural differences 
between societies. Only in Europe, one can identify diverse socio-economic mod-
els, and even greater differences occur when the comparison also includes coun-
tries of Southeast Asia. Thus, one comes to the conclusion that universalism is not 
the right approach in the construction of development, and introduction of Anglo-
Saxon models of management is not its sine qua non condition.
Institutions should be specific, tailored to the local context, which includes, 
among others, market structures, structures of power and political constraints, lo-
cal administration and informal restrictions. Quoting Rodrik (2003, p. 10): “The 
pre-existing institutional landscape will typically offer both constraints and op-
portunities, requiring creative shortcuts or bold experiments. From this perspec-
tive, the ‘art’ of reform consists of selecting appropriately from a potentially infinite 
menu of institutional designs.”
Effective reform will require a thorough diagnosis of local constraints and op-
portunities, and the possibility of building on local knowledge. Bearing in mind the 
possible negative consequences of the conflict with informal rules, the authors of 
public policies should in the first place as far as possible meet the social context and 
cultural background (Spranz, Lenger, & Goldschmidt, 2012). The process of institu-
tional change should involve the representatives of the community, and the imple-
mentation of rules should be preceded by deliberation and appropriate informing 
of citizens. If economic subjects understand formal rules and trust in their actions, 
this will translate into beneficial realization of informal constraints, to the benefit of 
economic activity (Aldashev et al., 2010). Because these are usually informal rules 
that are the primary source of trust, formal institutions should be the support for 
their implementation. They can do this, for example by providing: information on 
the specific economic problem and the sides of the interaction; tools for monitoring 
implementation of the provisions and efficient judicial system to settle disputes and 
execute sanctions imposed on participants (Ostrom, 1998; Boettke & Fink, 2011). 
As Aligica and Boettke (2011) write, systems of formal and informal rules, instead 
of imposing one specific procedure should transmit knowledge and thus enable so-
cial learning, through lessons learned from successes and failures.
Zweynert (2006) notes that often informal existing rules are identified as bar-
riers to development. Then the intermediate goal of the development strategy will 
be to change informal rules. In this case, the authors of the development strategy 
may face a significant dilemma – respect for informal rules or own recommenda-
tions to promote development. To some extent, this is also a dilemma between ef-
ficiency and ethics of solutions. The trade-off between these two options, howev-
er, is limited – the effectiveness of the strategy is to some extent dependent on the 
adaptation to the local context. Since the change of informal rules may take a very 
long time, one should ensure that in the meantime discrepancies between informal 
constraints and official institutions are not too large because it can lead to undesir-
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able results, as described earlier. These are the arguments for a gradual institution-
al change, based on the existing social structures.
The observations lead us to the basic conclusion – informal limitations must 
be taken into account during the construction of development strategy if the eth-
ics and high efficiency of actions is to be achieved. Summarising the analysis con-
ducted, one should mention once more recommendations on how this can be done:
– respect for local, informal constraints; where possible, basing on them the 
formal institutions,
– making incremental rather than radical changes,
– pragmatism instead of universal recommendations,
– the role of information and deliberation during the construction and imple-
mentation of strategies.
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